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Reviewed by Alan B. Morrison
The Burger Court and the Rise of the Judicial Right is very upfront about its thesis—
in its introduction, its conclusion, and in each of the ﬁve parts dealing with
a signiﬁcant area of the Supreme Court’s work during the Burger Court era.
The authors note that the Burger Court was “often depicted as simply having
occupied a transitional role,” but that the authors’ goal was “to oﬀer a diﬀerent
view,” namely that “a great deal happened during the Burger Court” (7). In
their view, much of what the Burger Court did either undermined what the
Warren Court did or refused to take what looked like the logical next step
needed to carry out the Warren Court’s changes. Here is how the authors put
it in their conclusion:
Equality took a backseat to other values: to the prerogatives of states and
localities within the federal system, to the preservation of elite institutions,
to the eﬃciency of the criminal justice system, to the interests of business,
and, above all, to rolling back the rights revolution the Warren Court had
unleashed (341).1

This review will mainly address the question of whether that judgment and
other similar ones in each chapter are supported by an analysis of the relevant
cases. The focus is on the main cases discussed in the ﬁve subject areas chosen—
criminal law, race, social transformation, business, and the presidency. It will
also consider some Burger Court cases that are not discussed in the book, as
well as some from the Warren Court that remain strong. But ﬁrst a few words
about the authors and then a brief discussion of which Justices constituted the
“Burger Court.”
Alan B. Morrison is the Lerner Family Associate Dean for Public Interest & Public Service Law
at George Washington University Law School. As indicated in some of the note materials, he was
counsel in several of the cases discussed in The Burger Court, as well as several noted in this review
that were not discussed. By way of full disclosure: He has known and been a friend to Linda
Greenhouse and her husband, Gene Fidell, almost since she began to cover the Court.
1.

The press release for the book describes it this way: “Though traditionally described as a
moderate or transitional court, the authors demonstrate that the Burger Court was actually a
conservative one whose constitutional decisions still impact the political landscape in which
we live today.” https://www.law.yale.edu/yls-today/news/graetz-and-greenhouse-publishbook-burger-court [https://perma.cc/6RNK-FTD8].
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“Linda Greenhouse is the Knight Distinguished Journalist in Residence
and Joseph Goldstein Lecturer in Law at Yale Law School. She covered
the Supreme Court for The New York Times between 1978 and 2008 and writes
a biweekly op-ed column on law as a contributing columnist.”2 Not a lawyer,
Greenhouse earned a Master in Studies of Law degree from Yale. With her
co-author Michael Graetz, she teaches a course at Yale titled “Warren Burger’s
Supreme Court.” Professor Graetz, who currently teaches at Columbia Law
School, taught at Yale for nearly twenty-ﬁve years. His Columbia biography
describes him as “a leading expert on national and international tax law,”
which has been the focus of his teaching and writing.3
The book deﬁnes the Burger Court as the seventeen years in which Warren
Burger was Chief Justice of the United States, 1969-1986. During that time there
was both continuity—Justices William Brennan, Byron White, and Thurgood
Marshall (who was not really part of the Warren Court, having come on in
1967) were there from start to ﬁnish—and departures and new arrivals. The
biggest change took place between June 1970 and January 1972, when Justices
Harry Blackmun, ﬁrst, and then Lewis Powell and William Rehnquist joined
the Chief Justice. Justice William Douglas retired in December 1975 and was
promptly replaced by Justice John Paul Stevens. The only other change took
place in 1981, when Justice Potter Stewart retired and Justice Sandra Day
O’Connor took his place (355). It is this Court that is pictured on the cover
and is the main focus of the book. Finally, although perhaps unnecessary for
readers of this journal, the fact that there is agreement among Justices on one
or even many issues does not guarantee that they will go along on everything,
which softens the concept of a “Burger Court,” at least at the margins.4
Crime
As the book relates, getting tough on crime was a theme for Richard Nixon
when he ran for President in 1968 and for Warren Burger when he was a
circuit court judge (13-14). This section ﬁrst discusses the death penalty cases,
followed by three sets of Warren Court rulings that sparked opposition—the
exclusionary rule, the right to counsel, and the required warnings for those
in custody. It then turns to the substantially increased availability of federal
habeas corpus under the Warren Court as a means by which defendants could
collaterally attack their state court convictions, an issue that was not on the
radar of the average citizen, but was very much a concern to prosecutors and
other state and local oﬃcials. The authors assess the Burger Court’s overall
2.

Linda Greehouse, YALE L. SCH., https://www.law.yale.edu/linda-greenhouse [https://perma.
cc/J3TK-A5E2] (last visited Oct. 26, 2016).

3.

Michael J. Graetz, COLUM. L. SCH., http://www.law.columbia.edu/fac/Michael_Graetz
[https://perma.cc/G66Q-HSDQ] (last visited Oct. 26, 2016).

4.

The book contains a few nods to those not familiar with the Court and legal doctrine—the
note on Supreme Court Procedure (pp. 9-10) and the translation of stare decisis (p.22)—but
in the main, it is a book written for lawyers, perhaps even that subset whose practices or
teaching focuses on the Supreme Court.
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performance on these issues this way: It “dramatically diminished the scope
and impact of the Warren Court’s precedents: they survived, but only their
facade was left standing.” (15).
No doubt to the surprise of some who are not close students of the Court, it
was the Burger Court, and not the Warren Court, that held the death penalty
unconstitutional, by a 5-4 vote in 1972 in Furman v. Georgia.5 Nine separate
opinions were issued, and the holding was a narrow one: The current death
sentences involving 600 defendants cannot stand because in certain respects
the imposition of the death penalty violated the Constitution. Five years later,
after states had revised their death penalty statutes in an eﬀort to conform to
the Court’s message, the Court conﬁrmed in Gregg v. Georgia6 that the death
penalty was still alive in some of its applications, but held the laws of Louisiana
and North Carolina, which mandated the death penalty in certain categories
of cases, violated the prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment in the
Eighth Amendment (26).
Given the narrow margin in Furman, the Burger Court could have sought
to reverse Furman and hold that there are no Eighth Amendment limits on
whether, under what circumstances, and how states may decide on the use of
the death penalty. But it did not. Indeed, as the book points out, although
the Court declined many opportunities to apply Furman to slightly diﬀerent
situations, it nonetheless mandated individual death penalty determinations,
in which defendants are allowed to introduce all arguable mitigating factors
(as are prosecutors for aggravators) (28). It also stopped the use of the death
penalty for crimes that did not result in death, including reversing the penalty
for rape of an adult and murder committed by another in the course of an armed
robbery, at least without allowing testimony as to the defendant’s limited role
in the crime (29-32). The chapter also has a very useful summary of death
penalty litigation while Warren Burger was Chief Justice and thereafter. In
the end, surely no rollback and some positive developments for death penalty
opponents occurred even while Burger was the Chief Justice. Then again, the
authors’ conclusion—that the Burger Court’s death penalty decisions did not
actually remedy the inﬁrmities identiﬁed in Furman, nor have they managed to
reliably separate out “those who ‘deserve to die’ from those who do not”—is
surely correct (36).
The introduction to Chapter 2, “Taming the Trilogy,” asserts that the
Burger Court “constricted greatly” the rights of criminal defendants and that,
while “[m]ost observers had expected the Burger Court to overrule the major
criminal procedure decisions of the Warren Court,” it did not, but instead
“eviscerated them.” (43). The chapter focuses on Miranda warnings, the right
to counsel, and the exclusionary rule, and surely makes the case that, at
almost every opportunity, the Burger Court refused to extend them or created
exceptions that diminished the eﬀectiveness of prior rulings. But whether those
5.

408 U.S. 238 (1972).

6.

428 U.S. 153 (1976).
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rights were “eviscerated” is a matter of judgment. The police still give Miranda
warnings every day, and some suspects and/or their lawyers take advantage
of them. Indeed, as the book points out, the Court had an opportunity to
overrule Miranda, but then Chief Justice Rehnquist’s 7-2 decision for the Court
declined to do so (44-45).
On the right to counsel, the Court has been very stingy in extending it
and has found it to be inapplicable in a number of situations, often having
to do with whether the accused was “in custody.” The authors are also plainly
correct that the right to counsel should include the right to eﬀective assistance
of counsel, and the Burger Court in Strickland v. Washington7 set the bar for
ineﬀectiveness at such a diﬃcult level that almost no defendants can prevail on
that claim. But almost none does not equal zero, and so even Strickland (which
was not a Warren Court decision) provides some protection to the accused in
some cases. Perhaps more important, no Burger Court ruling has suggested,
let alone held, that we should revert to the days when there was no right to
counsel in felony cases and before the right was extended to anyone whose
term of imprisonment could exceed six months.
The Burger Court record on the exclusionary rule is also one of new exceptions
and refusals to take the next step in protecting defendants. But the rule is still
honored as law enforcement oﬃcials now regularly obtain the necessary search
warrants and try to follow the strictures of the Fourth Amendment. Moreover,
almost every term the Court faces Fourth Amendment issues that would
vanish if the exclusionary rule did not exist. Again, like Miranda warnings, it is
a rule with which the police can live, if not love, and it now protects all of us
from invasions of privacy of the kind that could not have been contemplated
when the rule was created, as evidenced by two unanimous decisions of the
Roberts Court: United States v. Jones8 (unconstitutional to attach tracking device
for 30 days to a suspect’s automobile without a warrant) and Riley v. California9
(warrantless search of a cell phone violates the Fourth Amendment). To be
sure, the exclusionary rule was less vigorous in the Burger Court, but it seems
too harsh of the authors to conclude that it was “so circumscribed . . . as to
render it virtually impotent.” (49).
Any book that attempts to summarize the work of the Supreme Court
over any time frame can always be faulted for not discussing a case, but in
this instance, given the very negative assessment of the Burger Court and
its eﬀorts to “eviscerate” the Warren Court’s criminal procedure rulings, the
failure to discuss what happened, or did not happen, to the seminal ruling in
Brady v. Maryland10 is signiﬁcant. In Brady, the Court established an aﬃrmative
obligation of prosecutors to produce for the defendant any favorable evidence
in its possession or that of other law enforcement agencies with which they
7.

466 U.S. 668 (1984).

8.

132 S. Ct. 945 (2012).

9.

134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014).

10.

373 U.S. 83 (1963).
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are working on the case. To my knowledge, no opinion of the Court, under
any Chief Justice, has sought to overturn that basic due process principle,
although the problems that Brady identiﬁed still persist.11 While the due process
principle has not always been applied as generously as defendants would like,
or principles of ﬁnality (discussed below) precluded them from raising it, it
continues to provide an important protection for the innocent and probably
deserved at least a mention as an example of what the Burger Court did not
try to eviscerate.
The third part of the discussion of the criminal procedure rulings of the
Burger Court is, to my mind, the least controversial and, in many ways, the
most convincing. “Closing the Federal Courthouse Doors” focuses mainly on
the limits that were placed on the use of federal habeas corpus to challenge
state court convictions. Here the Court, sailing under the banner of federalism,
actually overruled precedents and erected a series of barriers that made it much
more diﬃcult, and in many cases impossible, for a defendant to have a federal
court reach the merits of his constitutional claims. The authors’ ﬁnal thoughts
on the Burger Court’s rulings in criminal law matters are surely on target
regarding the availability of habeas corpus: “The Burger Court was far more
willing than its predecessor to rely on the good faith of law enforcement oﬃcers
and state prosecutors and to rely on the fairness of state adjudications.”(75).
That observation also explains many of the other Burger Court rulings in
the area of crime, but readers will have to judge for themselves whether that
is the whole story of what the Burger Court did and did not do in this area.
Fortunately, the book provides the relevant facts of the cases and the necessary
background to enable the reader to make an informed judgment.
Race
The next part deals with race and considers public schools ﬁrst and then
universities, with employment discussed in Chapter 11. It is hard to dispute
the authors’ assertion that “[a] half century after Brown, our nation still suﬀers
dramatic racial disparities of wealth, income, education, employment, health,
and incarceration.” (78). The question raised by this part is whether the Burger
Court is accountable for many of those disparities because of what it did or
did not do in the area of education. The authors make the case that the path
to further integration was surely not aided by the Burger Court, but there is
no claim that the Justices tried to overrule Brown or to create exceptions to it.
Rather, their point is that the Burger Court had opportunities to advance the
progress that the Warren Court started, but did not do so.
The ﬁrst question that the Burger Court tackled was busing. Initially, it
supported the concept, but drew the line when the remedy required interdistrict busing because of de facto racial segregation in housing within school
11.

In his oft-cited dissent from denial of rehearing en banc in United States v. Olsen, 737 F.3d 625,
626 (9th Cir. 2013), then Chief Judge Alex Kozinski concludes that “[t]here is an epidemic
of Brady violations abroad in the land. Only judges can put a stop to it.” His opinion went
on to cite many recent examples, which included the case before him. Id. at 631–32.
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districts. The book also points out that busing was a remedy that extended
into the North and that produced very diﬀerent reactions from Brown, which
only forbade segregation under law, primarily in the South. The opposition
to busing was led by Justice Powell, a longtime member of the Virginia and
Richmond school boards (84). As the authors put it, “the values that Powell
held most dear exalted neighborhood schools and abhorred any sacriﬁce of
quality education by whites in pursuit of desegregation.” (89). The issue of
busing never reached the Warren Court, and so we have no way of knowing
how it would have reacted, but we do know that if busing is or were the
key to further desegregation, the Burger Court stopped it from having any
meaningful eﬀect.
The Burger Court’s other major school case was San Antonio Independent School
District v. Rodriguez,12 in which the plaintiﬀs challenged the great disparities in
resources between the best- and worst-funded school districts, largely because
the money for schools in Texas was raised by each locality. The issue was
whether the diﬀerences in wealth should be subject to heightened scrutiny
of some kind, and the Court said no, thereby sustaining the existing regime.
Again, the issue was new, and so no Warren Court precedents were at stake.
The plaintiﬀs had very sympathetic facts, but it was by no means clear what
the limits of their wealth-based argument would be, in the context of schools
or elsewhere. Indeed, some state courts have used this approach to re-balance
the funding of their schools,13 but whether they have succeeded in improving
the quality of education for all students is at least debatable. In this instance,
the authors’ judgment seems unduly harsh: “Rodriguez eviscerated the most
promising alternative avenue for claims based on racial discrimination. Finally,
by consigning the right of public education to the constitutional dustbin, the
Court constricted the minimal requirements of our Constitution’s guarantee
of liberty and justice for all.” (93).
In their conclusion to the public school chapter, the authors acknowledge
that the Burger Court did not seek to limit the impact of Brown, at least not
directly (102). They then observe that despite the end of “separate but equal,”
our public schools “remain starkly separate and grossly unequal,” and “Warren
Burger’s Supreme Court must take much of the responsibility for that.” (102).14
Again, the authors provide the evidence, and the reader is left to decide
whether “much” in this assessment is too much, too little, or just about right.
Chapter 5 considers how aﬃrmative action, or reverse discrimination,
as it came to be known, fared in higher education in the Burger Court. In
the ﬁrst case discussed, Marco DeFunis, a white male, sued the University
of Washington Law School, claiming that minority applicants less qualiﬁed
than he were granted admission, while he was not. The evidence showed that
there were separate applicant pools for minorities in which less emphasis was
12.

411 U.S. 1 (1973).

13.

See e.g., Serrano v. Priest, 487 P.2d 1241 (1971).

14.

Emphasis added.
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given to scores and grades. After DeFunis had twice been denied admission,
while the school admitted 37 minority applicants who would not have been
admitted under the normal criteria, he sued. The state trial court agreed with
DeFunis; it therefore ordered his admission. The university complied, but also
appealed. The state Supreme Court reversed, and the Burger Court agreed to
hear the case, even though no conﬂict existed in the lower courts on this issue,
which was then one of ﬁrst impression (103-04).
DeFunis was allowed to continue his law studies while the case proceeded to
oral argument. But instead of ruling on the merits, the Court decided to dismiss
the case as moot, presumably because the only remedy that was available to
the state would have been to ask the Court to deny DeFunis his diploma at
his scheduled graduation a few weeks away.15 What is most interesting about
the DeFunis case for this book is that Justice Douglas dissented because he
believed that DeFunis was entitled to have his application considered on the
merits in a racially neutral manner (105). This at least suggests that treating
applicants separately based on race, as the law school did for DeFunis, might
not have passed muster in some circumstances even in the Warren Court.16
The book then discusses the violence accompanying eﬀorts to integrate
universities, followed by the progress that was made before DeFunis, although
why the authors chose to reverse the order of history is unclear (106-14).
Whatever relief the Court felt from the DeFunis dismissal was short-lived
when Allan Bakke sued two months later for being denied admission to the
University of California Davis Medical School (as well as ten other schools).
He largely prevailed in the trial court and won the right to be admitted by the
California Supreme Court, which was hardly a bastion of conservatism in the
1970s. Based on the papers of several of the Justices that are now available,
the book relates how the Burger Court was divided 5-4 on granting review,
with Brennan and Marshall opposing for fear of what the case would do to all
aﬃrmative action, and Burger and Blackmun agreeing for their own reasons.
But Justice Stevens, who by then had replaced Justice Douglas, agreed with
the other four to hear the case, and so review was granted (116).
Like many other parts of The Burger Court, the ins and outs of how the Court
reached its decision are very much worth the read, even for those familiar with
the compromise decision based on Justice Powell’s opinion (114-22). In the
end, the Court preserved the possibility of aﬃrmative action in the name of
promoting diversity in higher education, but barred the use of quotas.17 In
the concluding pages of this chapter, the authors recognize the diﬃculty of
15.

DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312 (1974).

16.

The dismissal on mootness grounds in DeFunis contrasts sharply with the willingness of the
Roberts Court to consider the merits not once, but twice, in Fisher v. Univ. of Texas, 136 S.Ct.
2198 (2016), and 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013), even though the applicant had graduated from another
university and her only claim was one for money damages, mainly her $100 application fee.
Among lawyers who regularly have to deal with the implications of DeFunis, the case is often
described as standing for the doctrine of “If it’s very hard, it’s moot.”

17.

Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
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achieving consensus regarding the role of race in university admissions and
agree that the issue would not have disappeared no matter how the Court
came out. But the authors ﬁnd fault with the Court’s focus on diversity on
the ground that the decision “essentially disabled minority applicants from
advancing any legal claim (in the absence of intentional discrimination, of
course) [while] it simultaneously allowed disappointed white applicants to
claim that their rejection was illegal because it was based on race.” (127). After
noting that the Court did not “slam the door on minorities’ opportunities
when the nation’s colleges and universities voluntarily undertook to provide
them . . . it bestowed on future courts a basis for eliminating aﬃrmative action
altogether.” (128). Once again, the authors accurately state the facts as of 2015,
but describe them in a way that assigns responsibility to the Burger Court for
unleashing lawsuits based on claims of reverse discrimination, even while they
agree that forces in society at large were pushing, and continued to push, in
that direction.18
The Remaining Chapters
Because this is a book review, not a summary of a book that I would have
written if I had undertaken this endeavor, I will not examine the remaining
eight chapters as I did the ﬁrst ﬁve. Instead, I will highlight some of their
many insights and point out a few places where the judgments of the authors
may be subject to some marginal debate.
In the “Privacy at a Price” chapter, the authors nicely capture the Burger
Court’s treatment of abortion. The Court did, after all, venture into territory
from which the Warren Court stayed away, and when it ruled, it did so with a
resounding 7-2 decision, with one of the dissenters, Justice White, a Warren
Court holdover. But as this chapter explains, the ruling came with a price,
or actually two. The ﬁrst, which came to the fore with Justice O’Connor’s
dissenting opinion in the Akron case, introduced the concept of “undue
burden.” (153). That approach eventually gave courts and legislatures some
room to argue that as long as abortions continued to be legally available, some
conditions could be attached to obtaining them. Subsequent cases upheld
some laws and struck down others, but the basic right remained intact. Indeed,
in Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt,19 a law requiring that those operating
abortion clinics have nearby hospital admitting privileges and that the clinics
themselves be substantially upgraded (at very signiﬁcant cost) was held to
amount to a constitutionally excessive burden. The very fact-intensive opinion
strengthened the ability of women to obtain abortions, while underscoring the
18.

There is some irony in their conclusion that the Roberts Court is likely to end aﬃrmative
action entirely when, in the second Fisher decision, 136 S. Ct. 2198 (2016), Justice Anthony
Kennedy sided with the University of Texas and upheld its race-conscious admissions plan.
Further, with the death of Justice Antonin Scalia while Fisher was pending, and the fact that
Justice Elena Kagan was recused in Fisher but not in future aﬃrmative action cases, the fate
of those programs seems much less precarious than when the book went to press.

19.

136 S. Ct. 2292 (2016).
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reality that these cases will, at least for now, continue to be fought on a statuteby-statute basis.
The second condition is far more troublesome: It allows the federal
government to refuse to pay for abortions for women on Medicaid, making the
“right” to an abortion depend on wealth. The authors adroitly tie in this price
with the Court’s prior ruling in San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez,20
in which the Court refused to intervene to achieve ﬁnancial equality in Texas
schools. This is how Justice Stewart explained the Court’s refusal to overrule
the limitation on funding abortions to those that are medically necessary: “The
ﬁnancial constraints that restrict an indigent woman’s ability to enjoy the full
range of constitutionally protected freedom of choice are the product not of
government restrictions on access to abortions, but rather of her indigency.”
(160).21 I agree with the dissenters that the law was not about saving money,
but about punishing women who could not aﬀord an abortion. Nonetheless,
the authors’ conclusion that “This was Warren Burger’s Constitution in the
raw” (160) seems a little excessive.
On the subject of women’s rights in Chapter 6, the book gives the Burger
Court full credit for producing the most expansive deﬁnition of sex equality
that the country had ever known: “The Warren Court, for all its activism
and broad vision of constitutional rights, had been deaf to the claim that the
Constitution’s guarantee of equal protection had anything to do with women.”
(163). The chapter retells of the eﬀorts to impose strict scrutiny on genderbased laws, which ended up with a form of intermediate scrutiny that is almost
as powerful as strict scrutiny. It is mildly critical of the Court for failing to see
laws treating pregnancy as being diﬀerent from other discrimination based
on gender. However, Congress eliminated that problem with the Pregnancy
Discrimination Act in the days when Congress could be counted on to ﬁx
statutory construction errors made by the Court.
In “Expression and Repression,” the book discusses the Court’s ups
and downs in trying to regulate obscenity, an exercise that will surely seem
bizarre today in the face of the ready availability of hard-core pornography
on the Internet and elsewhere. The most interesting part of this section is
the discussion of the same-sex sodomy cases, culminating in the 5-4 decision
upholding Georgia’s law criminalizing the practice.22 Like so many other parts
of the book, the authors use the Justices’ papers to great advantage to ﬁll in
background points not found in the U.S. Reports, the briefs, or transcripts of the
oral arguments. Their conclusion that Bowers “was a devastating blow to the
gay rights movement” (210) was surely right at the time, but as they point out,
that loss was reversed seventeen years later in Lawrence v. Texas.23 Now not only
20.

411 U.S. 1 (1973).

21.

Quoting Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 316 (1980).

22.

Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).

23.

539 U.S. 558 (2003).
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have sodomy laws disappeared, but gays and lesbians have the constitutional
right to marry their same-sex partners.24
The chapter on religion is framed around the sometimes-overlooked fact
that the religion clauses of the First Amendment contain both a right to free
exercise of religion and a prohibition against the establishment of religion,
with the two rights often in tension. The authors observe that the Burger Court
tended to favor free exercise and had less enthusiasm for expanding the antiestablishment portion than its predecessor (especially by opening the door to
state aid to religious schools for secular purposes). Even so, overall the Burger
Court did not tip the balance too far in that direction. And the authors also
rightly praised the Court for rejecting the contention of Bob Jones University
that it had a constitutional right to enforce its views on separating black and
white students in the name of free exercise while maintaining its tax-exempt
status under the Internal Revenue Code, even with the Reagan administration
partly siding with the university (221).
The next part covers how businesses fared in the Court under Warren
Burger. Much of the six-page summary is devoted to the memorandum that
Justice Powell did for leaders of the business community, just two months
before he was nominated. That was before the days when conﬁrmation hearings
explored in depth everything the nominee had ever said or written; in this
case neither the FBI nor anyone who might have been concerned by its very
strong pro-business position discovered it until almost a year after Powell was
conﬁrmed, when it was revealed by columnist Jack Anderson. Given Powell’s
background, his general attitudes should not have been a surprise, but his
focus on speciﬁc individuals, including my boss Ralph Nader, was somewhat
of a shock. As this part shows, Powell was a strong voice for business on the
Court, but he did not always toe the line.25
Much of the chapter “Corporations Are People” is devoted to the
development of the commercial speech doctrine and to showing how the
ruling in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.26 is
mainly a pro-business decision. As the lawyer for the plaintiﬀs who challenged
that law, which forbade pharmacists from advertising the price of prescription
drugs, I saw the decision as a victory for consumers and for those pharmacies
that wanted to compete over prices. As I have detailed elsewhere,27 the Virginia
Board of Pharmacy case, and our oﬃce’s prior amicus participation in another case
24.

See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).

25.

I was co-counsel for Ralph Nader when the Court granted review in his dispute with
Allegheny Airlines for its failure to disclose its intentional overbooking practice. We
considered moving to recuse Justice Powell based on the memo, but decided against it.
In the end, Powell surprised us by writing the opinion unanimously ruling in favor of Mr.
Nader. Nader v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc., 426 U.S. 290 (1976).

26.

425 U.S. 748 (1976).

27.

Alan B. Morrison, How We Got the Commercial Speech Doctrine: An Originalist’s Recollections, 54 CASE
W. RES. L. REV. 1189 (2004).
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discussed in the book, Bigelow v. Virginia,28 whose rationale led directly to the
result in Virginia Pharmacy, were part of an overall strategy. Our goal was to
enable consumers to obtain access to useful information in the marketplace,
including ending the total ban on advertising by lawyers. To be sure, the
Burger Court’s subsequent ruling in Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public
Service Commission29 opened up avenues for businesses to both advertise and
make other commercial speech claims not previously available. Even so,
without the commercial speech doctrine, consumers would have remained in
the dark about important information aﬀecting them. My judgment may not
be entirely without bias, but these commercial speech decisions were, by and
large, a win for both businesses that want to compete and the public.30
The ﬁnal discussion in this chapter focuses on First National Bank of Boston v.
Bellotti,31 which was the forerunner, at least in the eyes of the Roberts Court, to
Citizens United v. FEC.32 The law at issue in Bellotti prohibited corporations from
spending money supporting or opposing ballot initiatives. Unlike the federal
law, which applies equally to corporations and unions, the ban in Bellotti ran
only against the former. In addition, various other forms of businesses, such
as real estate trusts, were exempt, for no apparent reason. Furthermore, the
plaintiﬀ was not spending money on a general election or a proposal unrelated
to its business: In this case the initiative would have imposed a graduated
personal income tax on the plaintiﬀ’s shareholders, and all it wanted was a
right to be heard in opposition. The Court could easily have decided the case
on equal protection grounds, using heightened scrutiny because of the First
Amendment interest in the political speech at issue, but it did not, over the
dissents of Justice Rehnquist and of Justice White, joined by Justices Brennan
and Marshall. The Court did, however, include a footnote recognizing that
contributions to candidates were a diﬀerent matter;33 but that did not stop
the Roberts Court thirty-two years later from applying Bellotti to enable
corporations to make unlimited independent expenditures in federal or state
candidate elections.34
Before discussing Bellotti, the authors analyze the Burger Court’s seminal
decision in Buckley v. Valeo.35 The decision to include Buckley in a chapter on
corporations is a curious one, since no business corporation was a plaintiﬀ
28.

421 U.S. 809 (1975).

29.

447 U.S. 557 (1980).

30.

See Alan B. Morrison, No Regrets (Almost): After Virginia Board of Pharmacy, 58 WM. & MARY BILL
RTS. J. (forthcoming 2017).

31.

435 U.S. 765 (1978).

32.

In contrast to the discussion of most of the cases, the authors did not discuss a number of
the facts in Bellotti noted in the text.

33.

435 U.S. at 787 n.26.

34.

Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).

35.

424 U.S. 1 (1976).
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in that case. Nor does the discussion of part of the ruling in Buckley—that
there can be no dollar limits on independent expenditures by individuals
in elections for oﬃce—connect it to the later decision in Citizens United that
brought corporations within that holding. Instead, the Court made the
connection to Bellotti, which sought unsuccessfully to distinguish ballot issues
from candidate elections. But as I have argued elsewhere,36 the real culprit is
Buckley, in which the Court issued a far broader ruling than necessary to strike
down the $1000 limit on independent expenditures per candidate for anyone,
when direct contributions of $2000 per election cycle could be made to the
candidate. Instead of holding that $1000 was unreasonably low in light of
the First Amendment rights at stake, and leaving other amounts for another
day, the majority saw the independent expenditure limit as the same as the
provision setting a ceiling on how much a candidate could spend from money
lawfully raised. Then, once there was no limit on what individuals can spend
on independent expenditures, it was much harder to justify an absolute ban on
corporations making those expenditures, unless one concluded that corporate
spending in elections was not governed by the same rules—a position that the
Citizens United majority ﬁrmly rejected.
The second of the business chapters is titled “Battling Workplace Inequality,”
which includes both workers battling companies and discrimination against
classes of workers (other than women, who were covered in Chapter 7). It
is both hard to quarrel with the conclusion and quite expected that Justices
appointed by Republican Presidents would favor companies against unions,
which is what happened under Warren Burger in matters coming from the
National Labor Relations Board. As the authors note, “The Burger Court
decided hundreds of cases concerning employees’ complaints of disadvantages
in their workplace. In the most important conﬂicts between businesses and
unions, business interests prevailed.” (295).
The record in workplace discrimination was, as the book acknowledges,
more mixed. The Court’s 1971 decision in Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,37 read Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 not only to include intentional discrimination,
but also to reach facially neutral requirements—such as attaining a high
school diploma or passing a general intelligence test. The Court found
those requirements violated Title VII because they had a negative impact on
minorities and had no connection to the qualiﬁcations needed for the job. The
authors could also have cited McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,38 which set rules
by which plaintiﬀs could shift to the company the burden of explaining the
apparent discrimination by presenting a fairly simple prima facie case. Instead,
36.

Alan B. Morrison, McCutcheon v. FEC and Roberts v. Breyer: They’re Both Right and They’re
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they focus much of their attention on Washington v. Davis,39 the constitutional
challenge to the District of Columbia’s facially neutral hiring requirements
for the police. I too disagree with the decision, but to call it “one of the
Burger Court’s foundational constitutional rulings” (288) widely overstates
its signiﬁcance. That is because Title VII had already been extended to state
and local governments, making the decision largely of academic interest in
the employment ﬁeld. The authors also point to the impact of the case in the
criminal law area, but its citations in notes 129 and 130 of that chapter fall short
of establishing their conclusion.
The ﬁnal section covers the presidency. In the ﬁrst of two chapters, the
authors deal extensively with the Pentagon Papers case,40 approving of the
protection aﬀorded the press, but then pointing to a lack of protection for
those who leak classiﬁed documents, without which the press has no sources
(302-11). They then turn to the eﬀorts of the Nixon administration to engage in
warrantless wiretaps in the name of national security, which the Court properly
halted (311-318). But the Court was far more protective of the executive when it
came to providing defenses against civil liability. In another closely divided case
that the authors discuss, the Court in a 5-4 vote provided absolute immunity
for all Presidents from all civil liability claims, even those involving violations
of the wiretap statute, letting former President Richard Nixon oﬀ the hook
(321). Readers will ﬁnd that decision to be either very, or just a little, harmful
depending on whether their main concern is compensation or accountability:
Presidents never act alone in these matters, and so if the underlings can be
sued, the harm is greatly diminished. The problem is not so much presidential
immunity, but the doctrine of qualiﬁed immunity for all executive branch
oﬃcials, even for constitutional violations, which the Court upheld by a
vote of 8-1 on the same day that Nixon received his absolute immunity (322).
Federal oﬃcials had long received qualiﬁed immunity when sued for ordinary
torts, although often the United States is liable under the Federal Tort Claims
Act. And the Court had oﬀered similar protection to state and local oﬃcials
when they were sued for damages for constitutional violations. The real crime
is not just that the oﬃcers get oﬀ in these cases, but that the governments that
employ them are not held responsible, leaving the injured to absorb all the
costs and pain and suﬀering on their own.
Among the most dramatic of Burger Court-era cases was one that involved
the eﬀort of President Nixon to avoid turning over the White House tapes
to the prosecutor for use in the criminal trial against his former aids. The
basic story is well-known, but its re-telling here has many nice additions. The
President had to turn over the tapes, which prompted his resignation, but the
authors suggest that the Court’s opinion also “strengthened the presidency”
by recognizing for the ﬁrst time a privilege of the President to keep his papers
secret, absent some compelling need of others (338). In this case the documents
were needed for use in a federal criminal case (and, I would add, the House
39.
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Judiciary Committee that was considering whether to impeach the President).
But even before that formal recognition, Presidents regularly asserted the
privilege, and no one was in a position to sue to test its validity. Moreover, in
the subsequent civil case in which Nixon contested the statute in which the
government repossessed all of the oﬃcial papers and tapes that he claimed as
his own, he raised the same executive privilege objection and the Burger Court
quite sensibly rejected it.41 Indeed, Congress has since enacted the Presidential
Materials Act under which the records of all presidents remain government
records after they leave oﬃce, and become publicly available in the future,
subject to certain exceptions.42
Every author, especially in a book that seeks to portray the overall impact
of seventeen years of Supreme Court decisions, has to make choices about
what to include and what to leave out. One neutral criterion on whether a case
should be included on the subject of the presidency would be whether the case
is one that every ﬁrst-year law student reads in constitutional law. I admit my
bias on the question because the case I have in mind is INS v. Chadha,43 in which
I represented Mr. Chadha. The opinion, written by the Chief Justice, struck
down the legislative veto in more than 200 statutes as a violation of separation
of powers. The authors include it in the book’s ﬁnal and very lengthy footnote,
but not in text. The limited reference is also somewhat strange because Chadha
would support the chapter’s conclusion that the Burger Court strengthened
the institution of the presidency, which it did mainly by taking away a potent
and potentially uncontrollable weapon from Congress. Whether the Burger
Court rulings that the authors do discuss “insulated [the presidency] in
important ways from liability and accountability” is one that the readers are in
the best position to judge.44
Conclusion
The subtitle of the conclusion—“A Lasting Legacy”—makes clear that the
authors believe that they have established that the Burger Court was far more
consequential than has been previously considered and greatly contributed
to “the Rise of the Judicial Right.” As their counterpoint, they rely on a 1986
speech by Justice Powell to the American Bar Association, a year before he
stepped down from the Court. The authors contest his “no counterrevolution”
thesis, instead ﬁnding his assessment to be “at once both highly selective
and internally contradictory—a mixed message that draws us down a path to
a conclusion quite diﬀerent from his own.” (339). It continues with a point41.
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by-point (subject-by-subject) refutation of Powell, largely drawing on the
conclusions that they reached earlier in the book.
One of the many positive features of The Burger Court is that it stakes out its
position loud and clear and leaves no room for doubt as to what the authors
conclude about that Court. In doing so, the authors are careful to set forth the
facts on which they base their views, enabling the reader to decide whether to
agree or not. To support their conclusion, the authors provide seventy-eight
pages of footnotes, which include many citations to the papers of the deceased
Justices, a feature that adds greatly to making the book of interest even to
those who are familiar with most of the cases discussed. In the end, while I
agree that the Burger Court moved our country to the right in several areas
noted above, I am more dubious about the authors’ conclusions in others, and
in particular about those that utilize emotional adjectives, adverbs, and, in
some cases, verbs to make their points.
A Final Thought
I presented this review to my colleagues at a workshop at George Washington
Law School after I had submitted a near-ﬁnal draft. Several of them observed
that part of what I saw as problems with The Burger Court was that the authors
had taken on the almost impossible task of summarizing seventeen years of
Court decisions, over ﬁve major areas, and trying to ﬁnd a unifying theme while
doing so. I agree, and if I were to start this review again, I would surely have
added that note of caution at the beginning. I would also note that the authors’
task was complicated not only by trying to encapsulate the Warren Burger era,
but also in seeking to compare it with the Earl Warren era. However, life in
the United States did not stand still for those thirty-three years. In particular,
signiﬁcant changes arose in the mix of legal issues and problems facing our
country that bear heavily on what cases the Court will hear and how they will
be decided. The authors assigned themselves a very heavy lift, and if they did
not fully succeed, it is in part because of their ambitious goal.

